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Paul Cobben
Hegel’s Concept of Corporation as the 
Mediation between Free Market and State 
Abstract The experiences of the communist countries in Eastern Europe have 
made clear that the centralized planned economy (without a free market) does 
not function. From Hegel’s perspective, it can be said that this experience is not 
just coincidental: the abolition of the free market includes the abolition of the 
institutional framework that enables insight into the formation of particular 
interests. Without this insight, it becomes impossible to determine the content 
of the general good. Therefore, Hegel’s alternative, self-conscious planning of 
the economic process while the free market is preserved, seems to be unavoidable. 
However, it remains highly problematic whether or how this connection between 
planning and free market can be understood. In this article I investigate whether 
Hegel’s concept of the corporation can help in finding an answer to this problem.
Keywords: Corporation, System of Needs, wage labor, rationalization, Hegel, 
Marx
Introduction
Marx’s criticism of the capitalist society can be understood as a criticism that 
is rooted in Kant’s categorical imperative. At the capitalist market the work-
ers are reduced to a thing, i.e. they are one-sidedly transformed into a means 
and, therefore, they are not recognized as moral subjects.1 This criticism can 
be immediately translated into a criticism of Hegel’s System of Needs.2 Also 
in the System of Needs the workers (wage laborers) are reduced to things at 
the end: their labor is becoming more and more mechanical and can, in last 
resort, be replaced by machines.3
It is surprising that this kind of criticism can be exercised over the System of 
Needs, if one realizes oneself that the System of Needs is not a positive, scien-
tific model of the free market, but rather a moment in a normative project 
1  “Der praktische Imperativ wird also folgender sein: Handle so, dass du die Menschheit, 
sowohl in deiner Person als in der Person eines jeden anderen, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, 
niemals bloss als Mittel brauchst.” (Kant 1965: 52)
2  Hegel, PhR, §189 ff.
3  “Further, the abstraction of one man’s production from another’s makes work more 
and more mechanical, until finally man is able to step aside and install machines in his 
place.” Hegel, PhR, § 198.
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in which Hegel develops the self-realization of the free will.4 In this devel-
opment the System of Needs not only stands for a legal institution that has to 
do justice to the freedom and equality of the legal persons, but it also stands 
for an ethical institution that enables them to realize themselves as moral 
subjects. The System of Needs is a system in which, on the one hand, the in-
dividuals are related to one-another as persons (it is a free market in which 
the persons enter into exchange relations), but, on the other hand, they are 
mediated by exchange relations, which serve their subjective welfare. Be-
cause, in the System of Needs, the mechanism of the market makes that the 
particular welfare is served in accordance with the general welfare, Hegel 
thinks that the individuals at the market realize themselves not only as per-
sons, but also as moral subjects: their particular actions immediately corre-
spond to the particular actions of all, and, thus, serve the general welfare.5
For Marx the violation of the categorical imperative brought about by cap-
italism is not only unacceptable (because it literally leads to the death of in-
dividuals), but it is at the same time connected to a development that brings 
about the conditions to overcome this violation. Also for Marx the compe-
tition at the market results in the mechanizing of labor.6 Labor becomes a 
purely physical exercise of power,7 i.e. it becomes work at a production line 
in which the labor’s quality is no longer determined by the workers, but rath-
er by the machines at which they are working. Labor has become one-sid-
edly corporeal. The mental aspect of labor is left to intellectual labor, i.e. to 
the scientist and technicians who have designed the production apparatus.8 
This means, however, that the power of nature is basically broken: in modern 
4  The institutions of ethical life express freedom. “Thus ethical life is the concept of 
freedom developed into the existing world and the nature of self-consciousness.” Hegel, 
PhR, § 142.
5  Systematically the System of Needs is the synthesis between the second moment of 
abstract Right (Contract) and the second moment of Morality (Intention and Welfare). (See: 
Cobben 2015: 90-94) The mechanism of the System of Needs (i.e. the mechanism of the 
free market) makes that the particular welfare can only be observed in a general form. 
Hegel elaborates under which institutional conditions this mechanism can result in the 
self-conscious realization of the general welfare.
6  “Die Gewohnheit einer einseitigen Funktion verwandelt ihn in ihr naturgemäss si-
cher wirkendes Organ, während der Zusammenhang des Gesamtmechanismus ihn zwingt 
mit der Regelmässigkeit eines Machinenteils zu wirken.” (Marx 1969 (Das Kapital I): 370)
7  “Alle Arbeit ist einerseits Verausgabung menschlicher Arbeitskraft im physiologischen 
Sinn, und in dieser Eigenschaft gleicher menschlicher oder abstrakt menschlicher Arbe-
it bildet sie den Warenwert.” (Marx 1969 (Kapital I): 61)
8  “Die geistigen Potenzen der Produktion erweitern ihre Massstab auf der einen Seite, 
weil sie auf vielen Seiten verschwinden. Was die Teilarbeiter verlieren, konzentriert sich 
ihnen gegenüber im Kapital. Es ist ein Product der manifakturmässigen Teilung der 
Arbeit, ihnen die geistigen Potenzen des materiellen Produktionsprozesses als fremdes 
Eigentum und sie beherrschende Macht gegenüberzustellen”. (Marx 1969 (Kapital I): 382)
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science the working of nature has mentally been appropriated. The modern 
production apparatus is nothing else than this mental appropriation objec-
tified in machines. However, as long as intellectual and manual labor oppose 
one-another at the capitalist free market, the broken power of nature cannot 
be utilized. The power of nature continues at the market, because the exter-
nal causality of the laws of nature returns in the form of the laws of the free 
market. Only if mind and body are re-united by abolishing the free market, 
a production system is possible in which the workers realize their own free-
dom, namely in a communist society in which production is self-conscious-
ly organized in service of the good life. Only if this is the case, products’ use 
value has priority instead of their exchange value.9
Also in the System of Needs the competition relations of the market result in 
the expulsion of labor. The mechanization creates a surplus of wage labor, 
i.e. of unskilled workers, exercising mechanical labor. Basically the market 
is not able to integrate this surplus.10 The only solution to prevent their star-
vation, according to Hegel, is colonization, building a new society elsewhere 
in the world.11 But like Marx, Hegel thinks that the mechanization of labor 
leads to a turning point that offers the possibility to overcome the violation 
of the categorical imperative. Like Marx, Hegel thinks that this violation can 
be overcome by suspending the free market. In Hegel, however, this does not 
mean the revolutionary transition into a communist society, but rather the 
transition into a self-consciously organized mode of production, that still 
includes the free market as one of its constituting moments. The institution-
alized free market is not only the necessary condition for the rationalization 
of the production process, but remains a necessary condition if this ratio-
nalization has resulted in a system of corporations in which the production 
is self-consciously organized. Rationalization is an ongoing process that can 
never be ended, not even by a class-struggle that is pushed to extremes, viz. 
the struggle between wage labor (mechanical, manual labor) and capital (that 
is served by the intellectual laborers), as Marx thinks,
In Hegel’s view, the mechanization and automation of labor rather express 
that natural reality has lost its status as an external power. The technological 
knowledge underlying the process of automation is developed on the basis 
9  “Die Gestalt des gesellschaftlichen Lebensprozesses streift nur ihren mystischen 
Nebelschleier ab, sobald sie als Produkt frei vergesellschafteter Menschen unter bewusster 
planmässiger Kontrolle steht.” (Marx 1969 (Kapital I): 94)
10  “It hence becomes apparent that despite an acces of wealth civil society is not rich 
enough.” (Hegel PhR, § 245).
11  “This far-flung connecting link affords the means for the colonizing activity—spo-
radic or systematic—to which the nature of civil society is driven and by which it supplies 
to a part of its population a return to life on the family basis in a new land and so supplies 
itself with a new demand and filed for the industry.” (Hegel PhR, § 248)
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of modern science. In modern science, the natural reality is understood as 
the appearance of the laws of nature that can be known by testing hypothe-
seis in an experimental setting. In that sense, nature has an essence that can 
be known. Therefore, also the essence of the thing at the market (the com-
modity) is not understood as abstract labor (as in Marx’s view), but rather as 
the pure law form, or (what is the same for Hegel) the pure notion, freedom 
conceptualized as pure self-relation.12 Therefore, automation of labor not 
only results in the violation of the moral law (in so far as the civil society is 
not rich enough for all)13, but it is also the condition that makes it possible 
that the moral law can be realized at all. Only if the natural content of par-
ticular actions can be understood as expression of our insight into nature, 
it is possible to satisfy the demand of the moral law: to reconcile particular 
action with the general freedom.
The possibility of moral action can only be realized under the condition of 
institutions in which the points of departure of the free market (the striving 
after particular welfare by the free and equal persons) are overcome. After 
all, action in accordance with general freedom is not in service of the par-
ticular welfare, but rather in service of the general welfare. This means that 
civil society has to be embedded in the institutions of the state, the institu-
tional level at which the general welfare is self-consciously realized. From 
this it does not follow (as in Marx’s conception) that the free market is re-
placed by a planned economy that is directed at state level, but rather that the 
free market is mediated by institutions that make the free market function 
in harmony with the general good (the institutions of the ‘Verstandesstaat’)14. 
In this framework of institutions the corporations are central. The corpo-
rations are production communities which together, on the one hand, take 
care of the production of goods that enable the realization of good life, but, 
on the other hand, function in the context of the free market. They not only 
produce for the market, but also recruit their members from the free market.15
The experiences of the communist countries in Eastern Europe have made 
clear that the centralized plan economy (without free market) does not func-
tion. From Hegel’s perspective, it can be understood that this experience is 
12  As Kant, also Hegel introduces a Copernican turn to understand the laws of nature. 
He transforms, however, the transcendental subject into the pure self-consciousness, in 
some sense his version of the Cartesian cogito.
13  See note 10.
14  Hegel PhR § 183: “the state as Understanding envisages it.”
15  Thomas Klikauer is right when he explicates the tension in this determination of 
the corporation: “However, Hegel’s corporations are also part of a market economy and 
hence follow a different route. While they follow Sittlichkeit, i.e. mutual benefit and mu-
tual and equal recognition, they also follow competition and therefore exist in tensions.” 
(Klikauer 2017: 223).
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not just coincidental: the abolition of the free market includes the abolition 
of the institutional framework that enables insight into the formation of par-
ticular interests. Without this insight, it becomes impossible to determine the 
content of the general good. Therefore, Hegel’s alternative, self-conscious 
planning of the economic process while the free market is preserved, seems 
to be unavoidable. However, it remains highly problematic whether or how 
this connection between planning and free market can be understood. Is this 
contribution, I will especially investigate whether Hegel’s concept of corpo-
ration can help in finding an answer to this problem.16
The System of Needs as the presupposition  
of the corporation
As, in Marx’s view, the formation (Bildung) of the production system in capi-
talist society is the presupposition of the communist society, so Hegel thinks 
that the formation in the System of Needs is the presupposition of the corpo-
ration. The fundamental difference between both approaches is, however, 
that Marx maintains that in the communist society the free market of the 
capitalist society is abolished, while Hegel admits that the System of Needs 
continues to exist in the Rechtsstaat as a moment that has its own distin-
guished shape distinct from the corporation. While Marx with the abolition 
of the free market aims to overcome a development in which some become 
superfluous, Hegel can only hold the observation that civil society is not rich 
enough for all. It is true that Hegel thought that this problem can be solved 
if those who have become superfluous found a new society (emigration), but 
the finitude of earth makes this solution an illusion.17
Since, in Hegel’s view, the System of Needs, is an essential moment in the for-
mation of freedom, its abolition is not an option for him. Therefore, we have 
to look for alternatives for emigration. How can the formation of the System 
of Needs be preserved and, at the same time, the process in which workers 
become superfluous be avoided? At the end of the day, in the Rechtsstaat 
16  Klaus Vieweg clarifies that the concepts of modern ethical life are not static, but 
must rather be re-actualized: “Ähnliches gilt auch für die Korporationen. Damit wird 
Hegels Konzeption moderner Sittlichkeit stets zu bereichern, zu konkretisieren, zu ak-
tualisieren sein, dennoch behalten die Grundkonstituentien des Sittlichen ihre volle 
Gültigkeit.” (Vieweg 2017: 32).
17  Also in Hegel’s time there were no uninhabited countries. Emigration to America, 
for example, was at the costs of the Indians. The ‘solution’ that Hegel presents, has its 
analogon in the family. As the family develops into the community of families, so the 
civil society develops into a (world-) community of civil societies (the mature civil soci-
ety is driven to “colonizing activity” (Hegel PhR, § 248). Also at the level of the family the 
finitude of the earth limits an endless expansion. The question has to be raised of how 
birth-control can be arranged in a Rechtsstaat.
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that stands for the realization of freedom for all, no-one should become 
superfluous.
The abolition of labor could be prevented by measures that compensate 
the working of the free market. For those who cannot find a labor position 
projects of employment could be organized. Hegel, however, rejects this 
kind of solutions, because they would result in a fundamental disturbance 
of the mechanism of the market. While the market cannot absorb the sup-
ply of unskilled labor, the projects of employment create a surplus supply of 
goods and services that result from the employment of unskilled labor. This 
means that the initial problem is only strengthened: the project would only 
diminish the demand of unskilled labor.18
At its basis, there is nothing against Hegel’s reasoning. If abolition of labor 
is caused by automation, then it is irrational to compensate this by organiz-
ing employment for workers whose labor could be exercised by machines. 
It is precisely the rationality of the working of the market, the ongoing pres-
sure to innovate, that is undermined by this kind of measurements. I think, 
however, that Hegel has to be fundamentally criticized in another way. The 
very problem is not how to employ unskilled labor (wage labor), but rather 
that the System of Needs generates wage labor throughout. How can the Sys-
tem of Needs, as a moment in the self-realization of free individuals, afford to 
allow a form of labor in which free individuals are reduced to their corpo-
real functions? Should not wage labor (labor that can be measured in units 
of time) be rejected at all as labor that is appropriate for intellectual beings 
because it condemns them to purely mechanical activity? Does wage labor 
not reduces laborers to a thing throughout, even if they are able to find em-
ployment at the market? However, if wage labor can no longer form part of a 
community in which freedom is realized, a new problem arises immediately. 
Especially wage labor is, according to Hegel, the result of the rationalization 
of labor. The pressure caused by the competition at the market leads to the 
theoretical and practical education of labor.19 This makes that labor appears 
as a process in which the underlying general rules are more and more explic-
itly expressed. Labor becomes more and more general and less complicat-
ed. Precisely this becomes clear in wage labor that can, as mechanical labor, 
switch between the distinct branches. Insight into nature not only underlies 
the mechanizing of labor, but is also the condition under which the produc-
tion process can be self-consciously organized at the level of the corporation.
18  Hegel PhR § 245: “As an alternative, they [the needy, pc] might be given subsistence 
indirectly through being given work, i.e. the opportunity to work. In this event the volume 
of production would be increased, but the evil consists precisely in an acces of production 
and in the lack of a proportionate number of consumers who are themselves also produces.”
19  Hegel PhR, § 197.
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To investigate whether the process of rationalizing is thinkable without wage 
labor, it is important to specify a bit closer how Hegel understands this pro-
cess. The kernel of rationalization is the process of education that results in 
insight into nature. This process of education, according to Hegel, is per-
formed in the process of production under the influence of the pressure to 
innovate that is induced by the competition at the market. Competition en-
forces qualitatively new supply or supply that is more efficiently produced 
and, thus, can be sold for lower prices. The innovation of the supply is en-
abled by a process of ongoing labor division. At the field of the production 
this specialization results in more knowledge of the nature that is worked on 
and newly discovered manners to use nature.20 Moreover, it results in more 
insight into the processes of nature and in the development of new techno-
logical knowledge.21 New technologies not only contribute to labor process-
es that are more and more efficient, but they even enable their automation: 
nature can be organized in a way that its working serves our satisfaction of 
needs. In the field of consumption the specialization results in a differentia-
tion of the needs. Needs that primarily appear as needs that are traditionally 
given, develop themselves and are transformed into needs that are based on 
insight into their nature. This means that the process of education leads to 
insight into the external nature on the one hand and to insight into the in-
ternal nature on the other. Precisely these insights create the possibility to 
freely relate to nature.
The above mentioned description of the process of rationalization does not 
seem to differ from a Marxist analysis. The views of Marx and Hegel oppose 
one-another, however, because Marx thinks that the benefits of the pro-
cess of rationalization one-sidedly fall to the class of capitalists. According 
to Marx in capitalism the highest stage of labor division has been reached, 
namely the division between intellectual- and manual labor.22 The developed 
insight into the process of rationalization falls to the intellectual labor (the 
intellectuals, the scientists and the skilled labor). The labor of the manual 
workers (wage labor exercising purely mechanical labor) is robbed from all 
spiritual dimensions and is, therefore, nothing else than stupid labor force. 
Precisely because a surplus of this kind of labor is generated at the market, 
20  “die mannigfachen Gebrauchweisen der Dinge zu entdecken ist geschichtliche Tat.” 
Marx 1969 (Kapital I): 49/50.
21  Vgl. “Since in social needs, as the conjunction of immediate or natural needs with 
mental needs arising from ideas, it is needs of the latter type which because of their 
universality make themselves preponderant, this social moment has in it the aspect of 
liberation.” (Hegel PhR, § 194).
22  “Die Teilung der Arbeit wird erst wirklich Teilung von dem Augenblicke an, wo eine 
Teilung der materiellen und geistigen Arbeit eintritt.” (Marx 1969 (Deutsche Ideologie): 31)
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the wage laborers can only accept the most minimal wage (wage that only 
guarantees a minimum existence).
In Hegel’s view, on the contrary, the subject of the process of rationaliza-
tion rather seems to be wage labor. He states that the process of education 
is shaped in the theoretical and practical education of labor.23 As a result of 
this education, labor becomes more and more abstract and ultimately can 
be automatized.24 In this way the rationalization of labor is a process of ed-
ucation in which the laborer emancipate himself more and more from tra-
dition and can ultimately freely relate to the traditional context of labor.25 
Just in this process the freedom and equality of the legal persons is realized. 
At the level of the Administration of Justice (Rechtspflege)26, the persons can 
participate in a legal community that enables them to realize their freedom 
self-consciously.27 The corporations belong to the institutions in which this 
realization of freedom is actually shaped. The education offered the individ-
uals the opportunity to acquire insight into their subjective particularity. In-
sofar as they participate in the corporations justice is done to this subjective 
particularity.28 The corporation is a labor community in which labor has the 
form of free self-realization.
However, it remains difficult to comprise how Hegel understands the edu-
cation in the System of Needs as the presupposition of the self-realization of 
labor in the corporations. If the process of education concerns the labor that 
develops itself into mechanical wage labor, it is not clear how this process 
leads to insight into nature. Those who are bearers of this insight become 
superfluous and disappear from the labor process. Therefore, Marx’s option 
seems to be more adequate. The subject of the process of education is not 
wage labor, but rather capital. Automation of the labor process is attended 
23  Hegel PhR, § 197.
24  Hegel PhR, § 198.
25  The function of the theoretical and practical education in the System of Needs, can 
be compared with the Realm of Education in Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes. The 
Education in this realm preceeds the freedom and equality of the ciitizens of the French 
Revolution. The Education is a proces of rationalization that results in a free relation to 
traditon.
26  Hegel PhR, § 209 ff.
27  The citizens of the French Revolution do not succeed in this transition (the French 
Revolution is followed by Terror), because they all have their subjective version of the 
general freedom. In the Philosophy of Right, however, civil society presupposes the domain 
of the state in which a subjective will is objectified who wants the general will as such. 
The Administration of Justice and the Corporations are institutions in which the state pow-
er expresses itself. Therefore, they can contribute to the realization of a community in 
which the general freedom is objectified. 
28  Hegel PhR, § 251 “a member of civil society is in virtue of his own particular skill a 
member of a corporation.”
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by a better understanding of the rules underlying the process of labor. The 
bearers of this understanding must, however, belong to the intellectual la-
borers and not to the manual laborers who are expelled from the labor pro-
cess. Since the intellectual workers will participate in the corporations, the 
developed insights will be maintained.29
However, also this option does not solve the problem. Those who have ac-
cess to the corporations are supposed to have developed insight into their 
subjective particularity. Therefore, they must have emancipated themselves 
from traditional relations. But it is precisely this emancipation process that 
was understood as the education of labor that as wage labor is expelled from 
the production process. This would mean that those who ultimately are ad-
mitted to the corporations have been working as wage laborers, are expelled 
from the process of production, have next educated themselves in order to 
acquire insight into their subjective particularity and, finally, have success-
fully applied for a position in the corporation. It remains generally unclear 
how the System of Needs can maintain its existence next to the system of 
corporations. This problem can neither be solved if the corporations are 
understood as institutions that produce their conditions of existence. Un-
der that condition the process of education would be an integrating part of 
the corporation.30 But how can this be understood if the corporation mem-
bers cannot be fired? Until now, the process of education was understood 
as a result of the innovation pressure of the market, the pressure to produce 
more and more efficiently. Expulsion of labor (that is unthinkable without 
the possibility to discharge) belongs to this efficiency.
If the System of Needs coexists with the system of corporations, does this im-
ply that Hegel conceptualizes two kinds of companies, namely companies 
that are part of the System of Needs and companies that are part of the system 
of corporations? Since they would both produce for the market, this would 
involve absurd consequences. Companies of the System of Needs would com-
pete with corporations. This would make the transition into a system of cor-
porations undone: it would no longer be possible to maintain the self-con-
scious organization of production.
29  “The Corporation member is to be distinguished from a day labourer or from a 
man who is prepared to undertake casual employment on a single occasion. The former 
who is, or will become, master of his craft, is a member of the association not for casual 
gain on single occasions but for the whole range, the universality, of his personal lifehood.” 
(Hegel PhR, § 252)
30  Hegel remarks that the corporation has “to provide the education requisite to fit 
others to become members.” (Hegel PhR, § 252). The mechanization of labor is not dis-
cussed at the level of the corporation.
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How to overcome the System of Needs?
The System of Needs and the system of corporations cannot co-exist as insti-
tutions that both participate to the Rechtsstaat as one of its moments.31 On 
the one hand, the education of the System of Needs resulting in the formation 
of wage labor and expulsion of superfluous workers does not correspond to 
the points of departure of the Rechtsstaat and, on the other hand, a system 
of corporations in which there is no room for an ongoing process of edu-
cation (as the institutional domain in which the ongoing transformation is 
performed from the finite individual into the individual that has realized its 
freedom) does no justice to subjective freedom. I think that this problem can 
only be solved if the institutional distinction between the System of Needs 
and the system of corporations is overcome. The process of education that 
Hegel situates in the System of Needs has to be understood as a moment of 
the system of corporations. I will systematically discuss which are the con-
sequences of this conjunction and which problems occur. 
 1. Persons who become a member of a corporation basically cannot be 
fired. Their access to the corporation makes them a member of the 
‘second family’32 that takes care of all tasks that we in our time entrust 
to the welfare-state, for example continue a person’s wage in case of 
illness, care for widows and orphans.33 This means that the meaning 
of power force as a commodity is highly reduced. It is true that the 
members of the corporation are recruited by mediation of the mar-
ket, but they can no longer be reduced to things by excluding them 
from the labor community because their labor has become superflu-
ous. This has to solve the problem of that the “civil society is not rich 
enough for all”.
If, however, the recruitment of members for the corporation is medi-
ated by the market, it seems still possible that people become super-
fluous. For the supply of jobs can be too narrow, or the supply may 
not match with the subjective qualities of the applicants. This problem 
can principally be solved by attributing to the corporations another 
mission-statement than the companies of the System of Needs. Their 
mission is not only to produce as efficiently as possible the goods and 
31  Timo Jütten’s thesis makes sense: “Meine These ist, dass die Versöhnung von indi-
viduellem Eigeninteresse und gesellschafftlicher Solidariät deswegen problematisch ist, 
weil es uns schwerfällt die Sphärentrennung zu leben, die philosophische Gesellschafts-
theoretiker von Hegel bis Habermas und Honneth beschreiben.” ( Jütten 2017: 159)
32  Hegel PhR, § 252.
33  “Within the Corporation the help which poverty receives loses its accidental char-
acter and the humiliation wrongfully associated with it.” (Hegel PhR, § 253)
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services that can contribute to the realization of the good life34, but 
also the preservation of employment.35 This mission implies that the 
preservation or creation of employment (even if this is not per se nec-
essary for the production process) eventually has to be recompensed. 
This can be compared to subventions and tax facilities that nowadays 
are adjudged to jobs that are created for handicapped people.36
 2. Employee are recruited by mediation of the labor market. The pri-
mary function of this market is to allocate the employees as efficient 
as possible. The labor community in which they exercise their labor 
must enable them as good as possible to realize their subjective tal-
ents. Since the employees basically can claim a lifelong participation 
in the labor communities, the labor market is no longer a market that 
can determine the level of payment. Somebody who once has a per-
manent job, has no need to compete with others. Therefore, other 
mechanisms are needed to determine the level of the salaries. In the 
actual labor market, by the way, It is already the case, that there are 
many mechanisms that determine the level of the wages. Independent 
from the market, for example, a minimum wage can be determined. In 
case of tenured labor contracts or job protection the influence of the 
market is also reduced. Collective labor contracts that are entered by 
mediation of the trade unions suspend the mechanism of the market. 
This is also the case for salary scales that have to do with seniority 
and not with productivity. 
Apart from that, a relation between the level of payment and the 
mechanism of the market could indirectly be continued. The profit 
made by the labor community could benefit all workers dependent 
from certain distribution keys.37
34  In that sense, also the corporation new style are “under the surveillance of the 
public authority” (Hegel PhR, § 252). We will discuss, however, that this surveillance 
cannot be direct control.
35  Hannes Kuch advocates an “Änderung der Spielregeln und Ausgangsbedingungen 
des Markte” (p. 200), especially “garantierte Gleichstellung zwischen Kapital und Arbeit 
in der Unternehmungssführung.” (Kuch 2017: 199)
36  Honneth states: “The structure of a capitalist labor market could only develop 
under the highly demanding ethical preconditions that all classes are able to entertain 
the expectation both of receiving a wage that secures their livelihood and having work 
that is worthy of recognition.” (Honneth 2010: 232/3). He calls these normative principles 
a “counterfactual basis for the validity of the capitalist organization of work.” (Honneth 
2010: 233) Of course, the normative framework in Hegel is not “counter-factual”, but is 
rather a presupposition of the System der Bedürfnisse, and must regulate the system.
37  This is in accordance with Hegel’s determination of the corporation: “In accordance 
with this definition of its functions, a Corporation has the right, under the surveillance 
of the public authority, (a) to look after its own interests within its own sphere” (Hegel 
PhR, § 252)
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 3. If the institutional distinction between the System of Needs and the 
system of corporations is eliminated, it is no longer possible that the 
subjective education in the labor process precedes the access to the 
corporations. In that case it is problematic that the central criterion 
disappears to judge whether somebody can be admitted into the cor-
poration, namely the insight into his subjective talents. This means 
that this insight has to be developed otherwise. But how is this pos-
sible when the insight is principally connected with education in the 
labor process?
At this point we can appeal to Marx. If he states that capitalism is a 
necessary stage in the transition into the communist society because it 
is its historical task to develop the productive forces, then he basically 
states that the insight into the working of nature when it is developed 
under capitalist conditions can be applied under the circumstances 
of the communist society. If the insight of modern science and mod-
ern technology once are acquired, then the institutional framework 
in which this insight has been performed, apparently must not per 
se be reproduced.
Analogously it can be maintained that the production of the system 
of corporations is based on sights that are developed in a preceding 
form of society (in which the System of Needs still existed). In the sys-
tem of corporations these insights are applied and more developed, 
but their ‘reality’ is guaranteed at institutional level and is valid as a 
social attainment. Starting from these insights individuals can be ed-
ucated in special institutions (schools, universities). This education 
can offer them insight into their subjective talents. Taken certificates 
can furnish proof of these subjective talents. In this way subjective tal-
ents can play a role in the acquisition of laborers for the corporations.
 4. What strikes in Hegel’s conception of the corporation is the partici-
pation for life. The education of the members is not thematized, be-
cause it was located in the System of Needs. This seems to result in a 
rigid economy without any flow. Moreover, it does not seem to rec-
oncile with the adage of actual economy that lifelong occupations are 
rather an exception than a rule. The idea is that somebody who has 
the same position for more than five years is a loser.38 
38  Klaus Vieweg remarks: “Zugleich drängt dies [die Behinderung langfristige korpo-
rative Bindungen aller Betreffenden am gleichen Ort, pc] aber auch zur neuen kreativen 
Formen des Korporativen, etwa durch Internet-Connections oder –Foren, soziale 
Netzwerke im world wide web, Twitter, Blogs, Facebook, Alumni-Verbindungen, Fan-Con-
ventions, berufsständische Messen, Kongresse etc.” (Vieweg 2017: 39/40) I think that all 
these new forms of cooperation can be integrated in the new-style corporations. 
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Insofar as the corporations produce for the market they are under the 
pressure of innovation. Therefore, the education of laborers must be 
a concern of the corporations. But in distinction from Hegel’s con-
ception this education is not preceded by education at the level of 
the System of Needs (we discussed that this education is situated in 
special schooling institutions) and will not lead to expulsion of labor 
(because the laborers basically participate in the labor community for 
life). However, this seems to provoke the problem of that innovation 
of the labor process results in automation, or, more generally, in the 
fact that some tasks become superfluous. Is not the consequence of 
this development that the labor community is threatened to be sad-
dled with employees who are basically superfluous?
If the preservation of jobs belongs to the mission-statement of the 
corporations can, from that point of view, nobody become super-
fluous. Therefore, the problem raised by innovation is rather that 
meaningful new occupations have to be found for laborers whose 
previous tasks have become superfluous. These other tasks can, in 
the first place, be created by means of education. For innovation does 
not only mean that tasks disappear, but it also means the introduction 
of new technologies in the labor process. It belongs to the respon-
sibility of the corporation to provide an éducation permanente for 
its employees that enables them to develop their skills in accordance 
with the new technological findings.39 Education, however, cannot 
be the only manner to solve the problem. Maybe there is a lack of 
jobs also for those who had extra schooling. Or, maybe some do not 
have enough talent to be considered for extra schooling. This can be 
solved by creating new (more simple) tasks that are necessary for the 
immediate production process, but can contribute to an improvement 
of the working climate in the labor community (like activities in the 
canteen, care for the esthetic in the workspace, organization of rec-
reational activities). The corporation can also unfold new initiatives 
that result in new labor communities in which there is room for em-
ployees who no longer have appropriate tasks in the original labor 
community. Moreover, the corporation can mediate in the transition 
into other labor communities.
The lifelong guarantee of employment excludes voluntary dismissal. 
But of course this cannot mean that the employees are forced to stay 
in one corporation during their whole life or that they are not entitled 
to resign voluntary and accept employment in another corporation. 
39  This dimension of education partly is already discussed by Hegel at the level of the 
System of Needs: “By this division, the work of the individual becomes less complex, and 
consequently his skill at his section of the job increases, like his output.” (Hegel PhR, § 198)
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In this context, a possible problem could be that the best employees 
leave the corporation to accept employment in another corporation 
for better payment. This would result in an unacceptable a-symmetry. 
On the one hand, the corporation would be obliged to bear the bur-
den to employ people, but, on the other hand, the employees would 
decide themselves whether or not they stay true to their corporation 
or try to achieve more benefit in another corporation.
This problem, however, has to be put in perspective. Participation in 
a labor community is not only about salary, but also about the sub-
jective self-realization that can take place in the labor community. 
Moreover, we already discussed that the level of salary is not one-sid-
edly determined by the market. This means that the improvement of 
payment that can be achieved if somebody switches to another cor-
poration will remain limited. That does not take away that there can 
be all kinds of other reasons that someone can realize himself better 
in another corporation. Maybe the comparison can be made with 
someone who has a position as football international. A football in-
ternational belongs to his club and has been enabled by his club to 
develop his talents. If a football international really has outstanding 
capacities, at some point a bigger club will present itself. Subjective-
ly the international could be interested because this club offers him 
better opportunities for the future development of his talents (or the 
environment of a new club could seem so attractive and adventur-
ous that it would in itself a convincing reason). The transfer of a tal-
ented international would mean a lost for his original club. Most of 
the time this kind of losses are compensated by a transfer sum. This 
transfer sum can be considered a compensation for the costs that are 
made for the schooling of the talented international. I admit, by the 
way, that in the system of corporations the huge differences in sala-
ry as we know them from the world of football will not exist because 
the salary levels correspond to legal boundaries.
 5. Hegel understands the corporation as a system of cooperation com-
munities that together take care of the goods and services that are 
needed for the realization of the good life. The analysis of the cor-
porations as a coherent system is problematic for several reasons. 
Firstly, the question can be raised of from which entity this system 
precisely borrows its unity. In modern society, the good life is not a 
traditionally given order, but receives a content that is involved in an 
ongoing development under influence of the innovation at the level of 
civil society. This especially means that new branches can arise in the 
production apparatus. (The ICT-sector, for example, was completely 
unknown in Hegel’s time.) Moreover, the actual production process 
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not only serves the national market (corresponding to a concept of 
the good life that is determined at national level), but also the world 
market. This seems to contradict a coherent system of corporations. 
The dynamics of the market rather seems to ask for risky new ini-
tiatives that exceed the prevailing frameworks (compare the rise of 
companies like Microsoft and Apple).
Next, the dynamics of the modern production process also seems to 
contradict the system of cooperation communities with respect to 
the lifelong participation of its members. If the modern production 
process presupposes the ongoing education, can it then be realistic 
to assume that its employees belong to the same corporation for life? 
Both problems can be made more manageable if it is brought into ac-
count that what Hegel calls ‘corporation’ does not have meaning so 
much at the level of distinct companies, but rather at the level of pro-
duction branches. For example, a distinction could be made between 
the corporation for health care, the corporation for the financial sec-
tor, the corporation for food and stimulant industry, the corporation 
for transport, the corporation for information and communication 
etc. At this level of abstraction it remains meaningful to speak about a 
coherent system of corporation and can, at the same time, be avoided 
that this functions as a strait-jacket. Dependent on the development 
of these dynamics possibly new corporations can be added.
Thanks to this more abstract determination of corporation (branch 
versus labor community) a more realistic meaning can be given to the 
lifelong membership of the corporation. It is true that each individual 
participates in a certain labor community, but he responsibility of the 
labor community to guarantee somebody a lifelong job is shared by 
the corporation to which the labor community belongs.
 6. The corporations not only must take care that all individuals can 
participate in a labor community that does justice to their subjective 
particularity, but must also guarantee the production of the goods 
and services that enable the realization of the specific content of the 
good life at the level of the state. This implies that what is produced 
cannot one-sidedly left to the free market. According to Hegel, it can 
only achieved by the immediate influence of the state on the corpo-
ration. The board members of the corporation have to be appointed 
by the government.40
40 “The maintenance of the state’s universal interest, and of legality, in this sphere of 
particular rights, and the work of bringing these rights back to the universal, require to 
be superintended by holders of the executive power.” (Hegel PhR, § 289).
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On the other hand, Hegel thinks that this may not result in rigidity 
(as we have witnessed in the really existing socialism). To prevent ri-
gidity he introduces a legislative power (the lower house41) that con-
sists of representatives of the corporations. If necessary they can in 
common consideration contribute to new legislation that enables the 
integration of new developments in the conception of the good life.
Hegel rightly pays attention to the reciprocal relation between the 
corporation and the legislative power. But the immediate interweav-
ing of the political and economic domain that Hegel expresses hardly 
leaves any room for the functioning of an independent free market. 
Therefore, the relation between both must be less immediate than 
Hegel proposes. On the one hand, the legislative power that deter-
mines the legal framework in which the corporations function must 
not consist of representatives of the corporations. It is not only im-
portant that the legal framework creates the possibility to integrate 
innovations in the prevailing production system, but it must also be 
able to take a stance to the production system in itself. The legislative 
power must consist of representatives of political parties that strug-
gle about the conception of the good life in the parliamentary debate. 
Starting from the conception of the good life that is determined at 
political level the legal framework in which the production process 
has to operate can continuously be adjusted. 
Hegel, however, has sharply observed that the adaptations of the legal 
framework need an ongoing input from the developments in the pro-
duction process. Legislation must have support from the employees of 
the corporations. Innovative legislation presupposes broad knowledge 
of the development that already took place at the level of the corpo-
rations. Therefore, an institutional framework is needed in which the 
corporation can continuously deliberate with the legislator, in order 
to attune legislation to the developments in the production process.42
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Paul Koben
Hegelov pojam korporacije kao medijacije  
između slobodnog tržišta i države
Apstrakt
Iskustva komunističkih zemalja u istočnoj Evropi učinila su jasnim da centralno 
planirana ekonomija (bez slobodnog tržišta) ne funkcioniše. Iz Hegelove perspek-
tive se može razumeti da ovo iskustvo nije puka slučajnost: ukidanje slobodnog 
tržišta podrazumeva ukidanje institucionalnog okvira koji omogućava uvid u for-
miranje pojedinačnih interesa. Bez ovog uvida postaje nemoguće utvrditi sadržaj 
opšteg dobra. Stoga, Hegelova alternativa samosvesnog planiranja ekonomskog 
procesa uz očuvanje slobodnog tržišta deluje neizbežno. Međutim, ostaje vrlo 
problematično da li i kako se ova veza između planiranja i slobodnog tržišta može 
razumeti. U ovom prilogu ću posebno istraživati da li Hegelov pojam korporacije 
može da pomogne u pronalaženju rešenja ovog problema.
Ključne reči: korporacija, sistem potreba, radna snaga, racionalizacija, Hegel, 
Marks 

